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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
uurisdicticn u conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Anr. §78-2a-3(2 . (c; ^ : • s53, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
r.7-*-"3".-PC .' < ': : •: -.:uended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal action may take a:, appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment cf conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a 
( * :\ . -Z hand, final judgment and 
CJ.VIC:,... .,'j: _ rendered by i.he Honorable Judge Sheila K. 
r:cCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake 
< . * *h. 
GLEN A. COOK, #3710 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Salt Lake City Prosecutors 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-535-7767 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GLEN SNYDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CRIMINAL NO. 881003189MC 
APPELLANT NO- 880550CA 
CLASSIFICATION: 
Priority 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appellant Glen C. Snyder was convicted by a four 
member jury on July 8, 1988, of one count of Destruction of 
Property, a Class B misdemeanor. Trial was held before a jury 
sitting in the Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Sheila K. 
McCleve, presiding. Sentencing was held August 11, 1988. 
Defendant was sentenced to six months incarceration and to pay 
$214.78 in restitution. Notice of Appeal was filed September 9, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
upholding the jury verdict demontrate that: 
1 Jury trial was held in this matter on July 8, 1/988. in 
the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. Ii i pretrial 
• u —.~-^ -_. T - • 1 y-* -xc ~ude any mention by 
prosecution witnesses or defendant's criminal record. (T a t: 1 ), 
The judge refused to rule at that time, requiring defense counsel 
t: o c h -; o c 4 : ,:: * v • " n :111 e r w a s b r o ached. ( T 1,2). 
..ic incident charged in the present case occurred in the 
late evening of April ?,, ] < ' Dallas Mullins and a friend, 
Jam** - v :: • • ..r-u.-..- * -^ • — ' -.=J-I ^ "-.- ""Pth Soutn and 
State Street, Salt Lake Ci r :y;y of t-.c AuaioTech store. 
While they were parked, a black Cobra Mustang pulled diagonally 
^ - ' - ; ': - testified 
at trial uicit Glen Snyder, in*- uefendant, o „t cut of the Mustang 
and "an toward trx- viot^Ti s ra: <inci tr^ed fie doer handle but: the 
d- . h • J i * v e 
assailant kicxed the passenger dooi w- idi - ^aiias Mull ins tried 
backing * e car 1 :• y>rc- hit a fin- hydrant. The assailant 
C • . - . • • . : ..-.,t i ' ^ : - h - • -•* M 1 ! 
windshield glass v;,:.-> fractured, showering glass on James 
Vansickle who was seated \- the passenger seat. (T 8 ) . On cross-
ex.i, «• . . 3t a ted rh •- y . -• * -'-*'•:>• * ook 
about i .,. :;ute and that he did not kno.v the assailant'^ identity 
prior "^-. :s beino tnwn i-le:i Snyder's driver's license picture 
t . - * ' *-
3 Sriydor roc* tno stand in h i s own defense and s ta ted 
the h<~ h - • : •- * • - <=- brother's car earlier that day but denied 
be:; j .; ^ ; . : ^ : . : ( i Oi I cross-examj i lation 
Mr. Snyder admitted to a felony conviction. (Record at 16). 
Trial defense counsel did not object, move to strike, move for a 
mistrial, or request a limiting instruction to the jury. 
4. The prosecution called the passenger of the car, James 
VanSickle, as a rebuttal witness who corroborated Dallas Mullins' 
testimony and identified Mr. Snyder in court as the perpetrator 
of the car vandalism. (T 13). 
5. The prosecution witnesses did not discuss defendant's 
criminal record. (T 1-14 and 22-27). 
ISSUES 
I. Was trial defense counsel's motion limited to 
introduction of defendant's prior conviction by 
prosecution witnesses? 
II. Was the trial judge required to rule ±n limine on 
defendantf s motion? 
III. To avoid waiver, was trial defense counsel reqired to 
object to cross-examination of defendant regarding his 
prior conviction? 
IV. Was any error harmless? 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Defense counsel objected only to the testimony of 
prosecution witnesses regarding defendant's criminal record. No 
testimony was elicited from a prosecution witness regarding this 
matter. The prior conviction was admitted to by defendant during 
cross examination. 
II. The trial judge was not required to rule ±n limine on 
defendant's motion, but had the discretion to delay ruling. 
III. Defense counsel failed to object to cross-examination 
of the defendant regarding the conviction. Defense counsel did 
not move to strike, did not ask for a mistrial, and did not even 
ask for limiting jury instruction. Any error has been waived. 
IV. Assuming that trial defense counsel's objection 
included cross-examination and that he was not required to renew 
the objection, any resulting error was harmless. Two 
individuals identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The 
prior conviction was referenced only as a felony, avoiding any 
confusion due to similarity of the crimes, and defendant did have 
his testimony considered by the jury. There is not a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED ONLY TO THE TESTIMONY OF 
PROSECUTION WITNESSES REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL 
RECORD. NO PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIFIED AS TO 
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL RECORD. 
It is clear from the record that trial defense counsel's 
motion was not to exclude any reference to defendant's criminal 
record, but only to prohibit such reference by prosecution 
witnesses: 
"I do have two motions, your Honor. One is to ask 
that witnesses be excluded as is standard and the 
second being that if the police officers or any 
witnesses who might testify against Mr. Snyder have any 
knowledge of his prior criminal record, that that be 
excluded from being admitted in evidence." And again, 
"What I would like would be a motion that he instruct 
his witnesses not to go in that direction. Not to 
bring it up on their own." (T 1, emphasis added). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires "a clear and 
definite objection" at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for 
appeal. See State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982) 
(decided under former Utah Rule of Evidence 4, a predecessor to 
Rule 103). Trial defense counsel's objection did not encompass 
all uses of the conviction. It was directed only toward 
prosecution witnesses. 
Prosecution witnesses did not discuss defendant's prior 
criminal record. (T 1-14 and 22-27). There was no error. 
II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RULE IN LIMINE ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION. 
Even if the plain language of defense counsel's motion could 
be strained to include any mention of the criminal record, 
defense counsel was directed to object at the time the statements 
were elicited. (T 1 and 2). Trial defense counsel failed to do 
so. (T 16,28). 
A trial judge has discretion to rule JLn limine or to await 
developments at trial before ruling. Rarely will a trial judge 
be reversed for failing to rule in limine. See U.S. v. York, 722 
F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840 (8th 
Cir. 1980). The decision whether to rule in advance will often 
turn on the judge's confidence or uncertainty concerning the 
relationship of particular evidence as to the case as a whole. 
Utah courts have recognized that, as a trial progresses, "the 
judge often has a more complete view of the evidence and the 
grounds for its suppression or admission than he or she does 
before trial." State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79,82 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1985). Indeed, some 
courts have recommended that judges delay ruling on the scope of 
impeachment until a witness testifies since the exact nature of 
the testimony might be important in determining the scope of 
impeachment. See, U.S. v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082 (1st Cir.), 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979). 
Indeed, the instant case demonstrates the wisdom of delaying 
a ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction. Defense 
counsel argues that in utilizing the criteria from State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 125 (Utah 1986), the importance of the accused's 
testimony would militate against admission of the conviction. 
However, the importance of defendant's testimony would best be 
determined after hearing the government's evidence. 
To delay her ruling was well within the trial judge's 
discretion. The trial judge advised defense counsel that he 
should object if the questioning went in that direction. (T 1,2). 
Defense counsel did not do so. (T 16,28). 
III. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION 
OF DEFENDANT REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL RECORD. 
HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT, THERE IS WAIVER AND THE ISSUE 
CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL 
Issues not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Page, 762 P.2d 1113 (1988). 
Defense counsel failed to object when his client was asked about 
the previous felony conviction pursuant to URE 609. He did not 
move to strike after his client answered, even though the 
prosecutor paused after eliciting the admission. See URE 
103(a)(1). (Appellant brief at 4). Defense counsel did not 
request a mistrial and did not even ask for a limiting jury 
instruction. See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (1988). 
The principle underlying URE 103fs requirement of a timely 
objection is that the trial court should be given an opportunity 
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it. 
State v. Eldredge, 101 UAR 15 (Utah 1989); See State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982) Utah Adv. Rep. The 
trial judge in the instant case was not given the chance to 
utilize the above cited remedies. 
IV. 
ASSUMING INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS 
ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Even assuming that trial defense counsel's objection 
included cross examination on the prior felony and that he was 
not required to renew the objection, any resulting error was 
harmless. Error is reversible "only if a review of the record 
persuades the court that without the error there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant." State 
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) quoting State v. 
Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982). 
In the instant case, two individuals with an excellent 
opportunity to observe identified defendant as the perpetrator. 
Further, the prior conviction was referenced only as "a felony" 
(T at 16), thus avoiding any similarity between the prior crime 
and the charged crime (State v. Banner, supra). Additionally, 
defendant's testimony was received and considered by the jury. 
Id, There is not a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
the trial t. -.bject tc cross-examina* :or. r^-carcing aef end nnr ' s 
prior criminal conduct, the j udgment shoi i Id be £:: i r :^ ed . 
Respec t:f i :i Il; 3 y s 1 1 bi i: i:i I: !::ed t: 1: i :i s j # fl day of ,/,*.* ^  
1989. 
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